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 Marvin Andrew Cuschieri 
Europe’s Migration Policy Towards the 
Mediterranean 
The Need of Reconstruction of Policy-Making 
Introduction 
The subject of Migration has been for centuries a matter of concern; Mi-
grants have changed the direction of world events, transformed underde-
veloped countries into prosperous nations, distributed more evenly the 
world’s economic and political equilibrium, affected significantly the bal-
ance of power and provided new sources for survival. They also changed 
the ‘forces of civilisation’ in various countries including their religious 
composition.  
Migration is a complex global issue that touches every country in the 
world. All 190 or so sovereign states of the world are now either points of 
entry, transit or destination for migrants; often all three at once.
1 Yet no-
where has the subject gained more importance than in Europe. Since the 
end of the 1980s, there has been a growing concern in the European Union 
(EU) with irregular movements of people emanating from the southern 
shores of the Mediterranean. The issue has increasingly come to be seen as 
a strategic priority in almost all member states and the EU itself.  
 
1   According to the UN’s Population Division, there are now almost 200 million inter-
national migrants, a number equivalent to the fifth most populous country on earth 
Brazil.  Marvin Andrew Cuschieri 
4   
Following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere 
European Council, the main components of a harmonised migration policy 
have been progressively put in place. The EU migration policy develop-
ment is linked to economic interdependence and globalisation that have 
driven European integration while eroding the territorial and functional 
foundations of the nation-state. Whilst developments at the EU level have 
attempted to give teeth to a common immigration policy, much of the 
rhetoric has not been accompanied by any substantive policy changes. As 
immigration-related issues shifted from national to supranational policy-
making arenas, powerful national voices continue to offer stiff resistance. 
In addition to these actors, some national governments are reluctant to 
delegate policy-making authority to the EU in this sensitive area of public 
policy. Whilst this tug of war ensues, migration pressures will continue 
building up, and as a result irregular migration in the Mediterranean expand 
-despite stronger enforcement measures.  
The fact that most European nation states do not consider themselves as 
immigration societies is important when attempting to understand the cur-
rent and future debates on migration. Europe needs to develop a new-
fangled political leadership to help shape public opinion in being more fa-
miliar with the overall concept of migration and its implications. European 
societies need compensatory immigration to balance the uneven age struc-
ture and to fill gaps in the labour market. In a couple of years, many Euro-
pean countries will have to develop proactive migration policies to meet 
burgeoning demographic and economic needs. For a relatively short period 
of time, European East-West migration will continue to play a role.
2  How-
ever, in the medium and long term, potential migrants will inevitably be 
recruited from other world regions including Central Asia, Eastern Europe 
and the nearest one to Europe – the Mediterranean region.  
 
2   Rainer Münz (2004), Migrants, labour markets and integration in Europe: a com-
parative analysis, pgs. 18-19. Available online: http://www.gcim.org/attachements 
/GMP%20No%2016.pdf.  Europe’s Migration Policy Towards the Mediterranean 
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Destination Europe 
The Securitization and Politicisation of International Migration 
Since the end of the bipolar world, there has been a gradual shift away from 
traditional security concerns, which focus on hard power such as military 
coercion, towards more soft security concerns. These, often referred to as 
‘new’ security issues, comprise very different phenomena such as organ-
ised crime, terrorism, ethnic-national strife and environmental degradation. 
At the same time in the post-Cold War era with less restrictions on cross-
border movements and globalization there has been a rise of legal and ille-
gal immigrants in Europe. This has led to a total new effort in the study of 
why people move and how sovereign states could protect their borders 
from this ‘new’ security threat. Immigration policies in the post-Bipolar era 
have therefore become embedded with the politics of sovereignty, national 
security and foreign policy.  
This securitization
3 of immigration especially in the Mediterranean region 
has been augmented by the events of 9/11 and the Madrid bombings in 
2004 with immigration being linked to international and especially Islamic 
terrorism. The depiction of international migration as a security threat in 
the West has unwillingly contributed to what Samuel Huntington has 
termed the ‘clash of civilisations’.
4 This has created a backlash in the EU 
member states with new legislation creating more restrictive immigration 
policies, internal controls of non-citizen immigrants and new cooperation 
efforts in areas such as Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). As early as in 
1991, a report on the security in the Mediterranean prepared for the West-
ern European Union (WEU) warned;  
 
3   The term securitization refers to a perception of an existent threat to the ability of a 
nationally bound society to maintain and reproduce itself. Securitization has 
emerged in new academic literature in the field of international relations and inter-
national politics, which even before 9/11, has begun to highlight fundamental con-
cerns about ‘new’ security issues. 
4   Thomas Faist (2005), The Migration-Security Nexus: International Migration and 
Security before and after 9/11, pg. 5. Available online: http://www.comcad-
bielefeld.de/cgi-bin/pagemaker.pl?name=workingpapers.  Marvin Andrew Cuschieri 
6   
“Europe can no longer view its security solely in terms of the establishment of 
peace on the continent of Europe, it must also bear in mind that its relations 
with its southern neighbours also concern its security and involve risks which 
at first sight are probably not of a military nature but affects its internal stabil-
ity and the conduct of its economy and, if allowed to develop, might in the long 
run jeopardise what now seems to have been acquired in terms of peace.”
5  
Among these “risks”, immigration appeared to top the list. The population 
movements that accompanied the revolutions in Eastern Europe, the out-
break of war in the Balkans, the first Gulf war, and steep increase in num-
bers of asylum seekers fuelled a growing suspicion from migration. At the 
same time unchecked population growth, poverty, unemployment, religious 
extremism and conflicts led to an increase in illegal immigration from the 
Southern Mediterranean to Europe. A consequence of this has been the so-
called ‘Le Pen’ impact on most European countries.
6 Immigration became a 
political and electoral instrument with the fear of the ‘other’ becoming in-
creasingly common in electoral manifestos not only of extreme right-wing 
movements but also of more mainstream political parties. A North-South 
division - with the Mediterranean becoming the front line - has thus re-
placed the end of the East-West ideological divide.  
Irregular Migration across the Mediterranean 
Whilst illegal immigrants enter the EU in a number of ways – by land, air 
and sea – the Mediterranean is nowadays considered one of the most, if not 
the most important, gateway through which undocumented immigrants 
seek to reach the EU.  
Migration has gained momentum in all Mediterranean countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA). These remain major spots of emi-
gration, and at the same time, they receive significant flows of immigra-
tion, whether destined for the region itself or in transit to Europe. The 
amount of clandestine immigrants travelling in un-seaworthy and over-
 
5    Sarah Collinson (1996), Shore to Shore – The politics of Migration in Euro-
Maghreb Relations, pg. 39.  
6   Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (2003), Migration as an International and Domestic 
Security Issue, in Hans Gunter Brauch et al. eds. Security and the Environment in 
the Mediterranean, pg. 444. Europe’s Migration Policy Towards the Mediterranean 
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loaded boats trying to reach the Northern European shores is hard to calcu-
late. The International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) 
has estimated that some 100,000 to 120,000 immigrants cross the Mediter-
ranean each year, with about 35,000 coming from sub-Saharan Africa, 
55,000 from the South and East Mediterranean and 30,000 from other 
(mainly Asian and Middle Eastern) countries.
7 These estimates are to be 
considered lightly bearing in mind the concealed nature of the phenomenon 
- still they give a picture of the nature of the crisis.  
This situation has led some to declare that the Mediterranean has become 
another Rio Grande. Yet the term, which refers to the Mexican-American 
border, is not fitting to the Mediterranean region.
8 Whilst the area consists 
of a cluster of sub-regions i.e. the Mashreq, Maghreb, Balkans and South-
ern Europe,
9 all these sub-regions have historical links that unite them. De-
spite its conflict-woven environment, the Mediterranean has not been a 
frontier. Since Hellenistic times the ‘middle sea’ has been the medium to 
bridge the gap between other regions, different cultures and diverse tribes.
10 
This state of affairs has been elegantly described by the French historian 
Fernand Braudel who claimed that the Mediterranean is; 
“… a thousand things together. It is not one landscape, but numerous land-
scapes; it is not a sea but a complex of seas. It is not one civilisation, but a 
number of civilisations, piled one above the other…”
11 
In spite of the Mediterranean’s long history of population movements, in-
teraction and interdependence, it is questionable whether the subject of mi-
 
7   Martin Baldwin-Edwards (2005), Migration in the Middle East and Mediterranean, 
pg. 18. Available online: http://www.gcim.org/attachements/RS5.pdf.  
8   Wihtol de Wenden (2003), pg. 443. 
9   Southern Europe consists of Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Malta, Cyprus, Greece 
and Turkey; The Mashreq consists of Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon; The 
Maghreb consists of Algeria, Morocco, Libya and Tunisia; and the Balkans are the 
six republics that used to form the Yugoslavian state.  
10   Thomas Demmelhuber (2006), The Euro-Mediterranean space as an imagined 
(Geo-) political, economic and cultural entity, pg. 5. 
11  In H.E President Guido De Marco (2004), The future of Euro-Mediterranean Rela-
tions: the vision of Malta, in Andreas Jacobs ed., Euro-Mediterranean co-
operation: enlarging and widening the perspective, pg. 9.  Marvin Andrew Cuschieri 
8   
gration has ever occupied a more prominent place on the region’s political 
agenda than in recent years. Today some estimates envisage as many as 20 
million people in North Africa opting for emigration in the coming few 
years.
12 This situation is even more worrying considering that many of the 
illegal migrants do not even originate from the Mediterranean area. Apart 
from the straightforward South-North movement from MENA countries to 
the Southern shores of Europe, there are also migrants coming from sub-
Saharan Africa, using the Southern shore of the Mediterranean as transit, 
and from Asian countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and even China. 
In the process, Southern European countries have become for the first time 
a powerful magnet to a growing number of immigrants coming from the 
Mediterranean and beyond. This has created an entirely new situation, 
since for more than hundred years, with the exception of France,
13 all 
Southern European countries were engaged in mass migration movements - 
but as sending countries. The traditional role of these countries as labour 
suppliers has decisively inverted since the 1980s. Over the last two dec-
ades, immigration into Southern Europe has increased on a continuous ba-
sis with Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal and the new EU member island 
states Malta and Cyprus registering substantial illegal migrants.
14 The ex-
tensive coastlines of these countries are the preferred options for entering 
Europe in an irregular manner, since they remain permeable despite stricter 
controls. The incoherent approach to immigration amongst the EU member 
states and the responsibilities on the first state of arrival has put consider-
able pressure on the South European member states. In autumn 2006, eight 
leaders of southern European States sent a letter to the EU presidency un-
derlining the need to reinforce operational cooperation in the EU’s southern 
 
12  Stephen C. Calleya (2005), Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations, pg. 128 
13  France is different from the other countries that constitute the South of Europe. In 
1851, when the first general population census made a distinction between nationals 
and foreigners, it registered some 400,000 immigrants. Thirty years later, this num-
ber had grown to over a million. 
14  In the first years of the 21st century, Southern Europe and Ireland had the fastest 
growing immigrant population. In 2003, relative to population size Cyprus recorded 
Europe’s largest net gain from migration, followed by Ireland, Portugal, Spain, 
Malta and Italy. Europe’s Migration Policy Towards the Mediterranean 
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maritime borders in a bid to stem illegal migration. In their letter, the lead-
ers call for a common solution to the challenge of illegal migration, “a 
problem which concerns the entirety of the Union and not only the coun-
tries on its external borders”.
15 Also, in an address to the European Parlia-
ment (EP), the Maltese president Fenech Adami maintained that; 
“Europe urgently needs an immigration policy that can deliver a more concrete 
response to this problem in all its complexity…a response that offers Europe’s 
trademark solidarity with the people involved in this drama; with the countries 
of origin, but equally with the countries of first arrival in Europe that are un-
able to deal with this problem on their own.”
16  
Faced with growing immigration, many of the European states have tended 
to react along similar lines by trying to ward off the arrival of more for-
eigners through stricter border controls, more returns and new regulations. 
This is leading to the emergence of a “fortress like Europe” where boarders 
are closed in an effort to discourage possible migrants.
17 However, the re-
strictions imposed on legal admission channels have on the one hand 
merely increased the incidence of illegal immigration in Europe whilst on 
the other created a backlash with an increase of organised crime and human 
trafficking in Europe. 
The Determinants of Migration in the Mediterranean 
The act of moving can promise much, but can also be a highly stressful ex-
perience. For international migrants, migration is associated with leaving a 
familiar home environment and settling into a culturally very different 
place. The question arises of why such a big amount of people are willing 
to risk their lives in attempting to cross the Mediterranean. What drives 
them in their attempt to reach the shores of Europe? 
 
15  Department of Information (DOI) Malta, Dr Gonzi writes to president Barroso and 
Prime Minister Vanhanen, http://www.doi.gov.mt/en/press_releases/2006/09/pr1 
286.asp. 
16  Forum Malta, Aġġornat, No 328, April 15th 2006.  
17  Stephen Calleya (2005), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the concept of 
the Greater Middle East, in Andreas Marchetti ed., pg. 9. Marvin Andrew Cuschieri 
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The ‘push-pull model’ is the most common theory developed on migra-
tion.
18 Various sociologists, economists and political scientists, have devel-
oped the theory, and whilst the types of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors may vary, 
the logic of looking at individual migrants as pre-eminently rational agents 
remains the same. The model distinguishes between ‘push’ factors that 
drive people to leave home and ‘pull’ factors that attract migrants to a new 
location. ‘Push’ factors occur within sending countries, that is, those who 
send migrants abroad, while ‘pull’ factors are positive aspects of the receiv-
ing country. In moving, migrants do not only see a lack of benefits at home 
but also a surplus of benefits abroad (‘pull’ factors); otherwise, the move 
would not be worthwhile. However, it is also possible to explain migratory 
flows by the predominance of one force, for example either the ‘pull’ effect 
of unsatisfied markets in the receiving country, or the ‘push’ effect of un-
satisfied labour in the donating country.
19  
Consequently, the greater the perceived difference in the net forces of at-
traction in places of origin and destination the more likely migration will 
take place. The Mediterranean region faces this situation today. The EU is 
attractive for migrants coming from the poor Southern countries and the 
relatively short distance between North Africa and Europe makes migration 
easier. One of the ‘push’ factors in the region is for example high unem-
ployment. The gap between the rewards of labour in the sending and re-
ceiving country are great enough to justify a move. Even if the EU itself 
presently suffers from high unemployment, the countries that constitute in 
the Southern Mediterranean coast suffer higher levels of unemployment 
caused mainly by past bad economic decisions and high population growth. 
 
18  There have been various occasions on trying to obtain a theoretical grasp of migra-
tion by the world of academia. An abundance of theories, explanatory models and 
systems, conceptual and analytical frameworks or empirical approaches have come 
to light. However, migration is hard to define or measure since it is extremely wide-
ranging and multiform and defies theoretical conceptualization. There is conse-
quently no general theory for explaining migration as a whole. Many of the theories 
are built on Ravenstein’s ‘laws of migration’, which one can say initiated the study 
on migration as a separate topic. In this section most of the work cited is based on 
Everett Lee “Theory of Migration” (1966) and Douglas Massey “Theories of Inter-
national Migration: A Review and Appraisal” (1993).  
19  Nikos Papastergiadias (2000), The Turbulence of Migration, pgs. 30-31.  Europe’s Migration Policy Towards the Mediterranean 
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Some countries in Africa have an unemployment rate of more than 25%, 
whilst others like Tunisia and Morocco declare a rate of unemployment of 
16%, although in reality, the situation is much worse. In Algeria for exam-
ple, unemployment hits one out of three young adults in the active popula-
tion.
20 At the same time, the population of the Southern shores of the 
Mediterranean presently has an average rate of 2.8% increase per annum 
compared to 0.4% in the EU. This demographic time bomb will certainly in 
the near future increase concerns and be a source of instability in the Medi-
terranean area. In addition low education standards are not ensuring ade-
quate job opportunities that translate into better socio-economic conditions. 
The lack of political participation, violence, social unrest, violation of hu-
man rights and authoritarian regimes has furthermore pushed people to 
seek refuge in EU member states.  
 
Push factors in the MENA region 
International war and annexation (ex: Israeli-
Palestinian conflict) 
Repression of minorities (ex: Kurds in Turkey, 
Assyrochaldeans in Syria, Kabyles in Algeria) 
Internal armed conflicts such as civil war, seces-
sion, dissolution or other internal national or ethnic 
conflicts (ex: the present Iraq, Somalia, Sudan 
crises) 
Poverty  
Unemployment 
Lack of natural resources (ex: water) 
Totalitarian regime with political persecution or 
genocide 
Forced resettlement 
Permanent low-wage levels 
International terrorism 
Persecution (both on religious and political 
grounds); 
Overpopulation 
Environmental factors/Ecological Devastation (ex: 
desertification in Africa) 
Poor governance 
 
On the other hand there are various ‘pull’ factors for potential immigrants 
in the EU. The fact that salaries in Europe could be up to ten times higher 
than in the South creates an incentive for people to cross the Mediterranean 
in their quest for a better quality of life. Greater job mobility, the possibility 
 
20  Philippe Fargues (2005), Temporary Migration: Matching Demand in the EU with 
Supply from the MENA, pg. 5. Available online: http://www.carim.org/Publications/ 
CARIM-AS05_11-Fargues.pdf Marvin Andrew Cuschieri 
12   
of professional career development, family ties and access to the European 
countries welfare system are strong motivations to emigrate. At the same 
time, rich EU member states are creating thousands of jobs that domestic 
workers refuse to fill but migrant workers will cross borders to take. The 
fact that Europe has low fertility rates and an ageing workforce with the 
baby boomers of the post-second World War period already starting to re-
tire creates an incentive for migrants to move to Europe. Past European co-
lonial ties also supply a ‘pull’ factor, not only because of the former 
political relationship, but also because of language similarities.  
 
Pull factors in the EU 
Matrimonial exchanges 
Access to welfare 
Historical colonial ties (ex: Algerians in France) 
High standards of living (Europe having some of 
the highest wages in the world) 
Ageing societies 
Opportunities for higher education or advanced 
training; 
Overall economic prosperity 
Family reunion 
Need of workers in some sectors of the domestic 
markets 
Maintenance of the rule of law 
Democracy 
Pluralism 
Effective protection of Human Rights (including 
the guiding principles of freedom of worship and 
tolerance towards different ethnic groups)  
Habitable living space 
Affirmation of one’s skills 
Political stability 
Rapid economic development in the southern 
European countries 
Shadow economies in European countries 
 
Apart from the ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors, there are also ambiguous factors, 
called ‘network’ factors that can either facilitate or deter migration. Net-
works include, for example, the links with relatives or friends abroad. Such 
ties facilitate trips by providing funds or information to potential migrants 
(such as the specific labour needs of a country), and they facilitate the ad-
aptation of the newcomer in the host country. Furthermore, they help to 
avoid legal constraints in the host countries, and influence choice of desti-
nation. These have been augmented recently due to the advancement in 
communications and technology leaving in the process a profound effect on Europe’s Migration Policy Towards the Mediterranean 
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international migration.
21 At the same time, such networks could also be 
criminal ones of professional traffickers who act as smugglers.  
The Process of Policy Harmonisation 
Shaping Europe’s Migration policy 
With the steady increase in immigration in the advanced industrial democ-
racies, many nation states began to search for ways to stop or slow the in-
flux. At the same time migration became entrenched into the politics of 
these countries. In traditional countries of immigration, this was not the 
first time that the matter had become a national political issue; but for many 
European states, this was a relatively new phenomenon. How would differ-
ent European political systems cope with immigration? Would there be a 
convergence of policy responses or would each state pursue different con-
trol policies?  
The reaction of the EU member states has been two-fold. On the one hand, 
states have continued to consider illegal immigration as a national problem, 
creating laws etc. aimed at curbing this ‘threat’, yet at the same time the 
member states have gradually increased their efforts to coordinate, and to 
an extent harmonize their policies on the EU level.  
It is not an undisclosed matter that member states have ‘used’ the EU to 
avoid domestic legal and political constraints to attain their domestic policy 
objectives. From this perspective, the development of EU immigration and 
asylum cooperation and integration is, to an extent, a reassertion of control 
capacity and allows member states to pursue their domestic migration 
agenda by other means. Governments have tended to ‘blame’ Brussels for 
politically unpopular yet necessary policies on immigration.
22 Apart from 
all this, open internal borders means that one government’s immigration 
 
21  Heinz Fassmann, et al. (2005), International migration and its regulation, pgs. 20-
21. Available online: http://www.imiscoe.org/workingpapers/documents/internatio 
nal_migration.pdf.  
22  Gallya Lahav (2004), Immigration and Politics in the New Europe – Reinventing 
Borders, pg. 54. Marvin Andrew Cuschieri 
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policy has a potential impact on another member state. This has led to gov-
ernments accepting that migration should be tackled collectively on a 
European supranational level and work on some form of burden sharing.  
Different periods can be distinguished in the development of a common 
migration policy for the EU each one leaving some kind of impact on the 
Mediterranean region. Progress on the EU level has been carried out in-
crementally, and is still going on today. The main predicament is the re-
fusal of member states to cede totally their sovereignty on migration and 
other matters normally associated with the question such as border controls 
and citizenship rights. 
Communitarisation – is it genuine? 
The parameters of a common EU immigration and asylum policy were set 
out by Amsterdam and given clearer definition at the Tampere meeting in 
October 1999. Nonetheless, today there is still the distinction between the 
intra-EU migration regime that is centred on market making and the extra-
EU migration that consists of people control and security concerns. The EU 
presently defines how the member states should grant asylum, visas, and 
temporary protection to non-EU nationals – with both the Commission and 
the EP playing a role in shaping policies.
23 Yet at the same time, it is still 
the member states who control most aspects of immigration policies (such 
as residency permits, citizenship and which people are given work per-
mits).  
Throughout recent years a common migration policy has begun to emerge 
on the EU level however questions remain about the political will of the 
member states. For example, the Constitutional Treaty reiterates the mem-
ber states right to determine volumes of admission in their own markets,
24 
even if migration issues ought to be under the first pillar. The fact is that 
concerns about terrorism in the wake of the events on 9/11, and a growing 
 
23  Hix (2005), pg. 356. 
24  Article III-267 (5) maintains “that the right of Member States to determine volumes 
of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory 
in order to seek work, whether employed or self-employed” shall not be affected. Europe’s Migration Policy Towards the Mediterranean 
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interest in extreme right politics
25 have left their impact on the development 
of a common migration policy on the EU level. Immigration is highly sen-
sitive and politically charged and many of the proposals remain just that.  
Recent developments in the Mediterranean have taken a negative turn es-
pecially since the number of ‘boat people’ continues to increase. Xenopho-
bia is increasing in all Southern European countries (and in the rest of 
Europe) with immigration becoming a highly politicised issue. Some coun-
tries have taken matters in their ‘own hands’ like for example the Italian 
attempt to prevent illegal immigration by signing bilateral agreements with 
Tunisia, Morocco and Libya linking re-admission agreements with devel-
opment aid and small scale immigration quotas. An important note here is 
that Libya does not even recognize the Geneva Convention and does not 
participate in the Barcelona process.
26 Britain in 2003 also suggested the 
idea of ‘transit camps’ in North Africa, an idea which was rejected by both 
the European Council meeting in Thessaloniki and the EP. 
The passive resistance opposed by national sovereignties to convergence 
and harmonisation is reflected in the slow implementation of any legisla-
tive proposals. Migration legislation is also a constant work in progress, 
which calls for frequent adjustments. This makes it easier for governments 
to play with the rules and enact own laws promised in some election mani-
festo on the fear of an influx of migration. It is a matter of fact that during 
periods of high immigration, unemployment and rising inequalities the 
public becomes aroused and some politicians inevitably draw upon this to 
mobilize voters - in the process politicizing immigration policy formula-
tion. Even on the European level, we can see such tendencies. For example, 
the European Council held in Seville inverted the priorities and put control 
before migration management, proving how the evolution of immigration 
 
25  For example, political parties advocating, ‘zero immigration’ have garnered more 
than 10% of the votes cast in half a dozen EU countries. 
26   Martin Baldwin-Edwards (2005), Migration into Southern Europe: Non-legality 
and labour markets in the region, pgs. 5-6. Available online: http://www.mmo.gr/ 
pdf/publications/mmo_working_papers/MMO_WP6.pdf. Marvin Andrew Cuschieri 
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policies at a Community level depends on the international political agenda 
and the member states’ interests.
27  
Several difficult issues remain to be solved for a truly common migration 
policy, which addresses the needs and problems of all the EU member 
states and the countries of origin in the Mediterranean region and beyond. 
The solutions of course will require strong political commitments and will-
ingness to compromise. Demand for common immigration process has in-
creased not only from the Southern members who cannot cope alone with 
immigration, but also from other member states that are less exposed. 
Hence it is clear that a supranational approach is needed to provide added 
value for both the EU and the Mediterranean region. This will be the sub-
ject matter of the last part of this paper.  
Towards better policy-making 
The Need of a new approach to immigration – from ‘zero migration’ 
to migration management 
Given the differences that exist between member states with respect to 
links to countries of origin, the capacity of reception, and labour market 
needs, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the best way to achieve a regu-
lated immigration policy is to establish an overall framework at EU level. 
This should include common standards and procedures and a mechanism 
for setting objectives and indicative targets, within which member states 
could develop and implement national policies. Antonio Vitorino, the 
European Commissioner for JHA in the Prodi Commission back in 2001 
retained that: “No one today I think questions the need for a European ap-
proach to reinforce national policies. Migration is a global phenomenon 
which is set to continue and as such our response must be coordinated, 
comprehensive and forward-looking.”
28  
 
27  Aubarell and Aragall, pg. 11. 
28  Antonio  Vitorino,  On the Immigration Policy, 2001, pg. 2. Available online: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/01/463&format
=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. Europe’s Migration Policy Towards the Mediterranean 
  17
After nearly thirty years of pursuing restrictive immigration policies and 
half-hearted efforts at communitarisation, EU countries have begun to reas-
sess their migration policies and to call for a different approach. For the 
first time in many years, several governments are considering the benefits 
of labour migration and the possibilities and merits of increasing immigra-
tion for demographic and other reasons. Already in the Hague program, for 
example it was stated that ‘international migration will continue’
29 and that 
better strategies should be developed. “More Europe” is certainly needed in 
order to tackle the root causes of forced migration and fight in a just and 
sustainable way against illegal migration. Naturally, the EU to obtain all 
this not only needs a common migration policy but also a strong and bold 
common foreign and security policy.  
Today there is still a debate between those who argue for restrictive poli-
cies to curtail migration, be it economic migration or refugees, and those 
who look at the decrease in available labour and population ageing and ad-
vocate approaches that are more liberal. The 1990s ‘zero immigration’ 
policies did not stop people attempting to cross the Mediterranean. Thus 
moving on to migration management policies will allow countries and the 
EU as a whole to reap the benefits of immigration and integration. Voters 
may not like immigration but they are more likely to tolerate it if policy 
appears to be orderly rather than chaotic. The European Commission has 
strongly argued in favour of a new approach. In November 2000, it pub-
lished a Communication in which it stated that: 
“It is clear from an analysis of the economic and demographic context of the 
Union and of the countries of origin, that the ‘zero immigration’ policies of the 
past 30 years are no longer appropriate.”
30 
The Communication clearly brings into perspective that the EU must take 
into account that the main world regions are already competing to attract 
 
29  Jean-Pierre Cassarino, Web site guide on Europe’s Migration policy in the Mediter-
ranean: An overview, pg. 13. Available online: http://www.carim.org/publications/ 
CARIM-AS05_10-Cassarino.pdf. 
30  Commission  Communication,  On a Community Immigration Policy, 
COM(2000)757 final, pg. 3. Available online: http://europa.eu/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/ 
2000/com2000_0757en01.pdf.  Marvin Andrew Cuschieri 
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migrants to meet the needs of their economies whilst at the same time 
Europe is ageing. Hence the need for a genuine common European initia-
tive is strengthened by the fact that in the absence of common suprana-
tional rules the number of migrants entering the EU illegally will only 
grow. It is clear that the past feeble efforts towards harmonization have to 
change for the simple reason that it is paradoxical that internal common 
rules on the movement within the common market are not mirrored exter-
nally.  
European Demography and Skill shortages – reasons for a man-
aged immigration approach 
Many industrial countries are concerned with the effects of low fertility on 
population age structure, and by extension, on the labour force and the vi-
ability of government pension systems.
31 Yet nowhere in the world is the 
problem so acute than in the EU.
32 Europe’s demographic situation is char-
acterised by longevity and low fertility.
33 This has led to the ageing of 
Europe’s society and the eventual shrinking of domestic populations and 
workforces characterised by low fertility rates.
34 Various suggestions have 
been proposed to address negative demographic prospective - including 
rising the retirement age and increasing payroll taxes. Another one is to in-
crease immigration to help population growth (or at least stem its decline), 
have a younger workforce, and increase the ratio of workers to retirees. At 
the end of the 1990s, already more than a third of the regions of the EU 
were experiencing a decrease in population. Between 2005 and 2025, 
 
31  Brettell and Hollifield (2005), pg. 55. 
32  The recent enlargement of the EU is not expected to have a significant impact on 
the ageing process of the Union’s population. Though the proportion of older peo-
ple in the Central and Eastern European is lower than EU15 it is expected to in-
crease rapidly attaining the EU average levels by 2050.  
33  Whereas in 2004 there was, one elderly inactive person for every four persons of 
working age, in 2050 there would be about one inactive person for two of working 
age.  
34  The mid term Lisbon report from the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok em-
phasised the importance of the demographic challenge for the Lisbon strategy: age-
ing could cause potential annual growth in GNP in Europe to fall from 2-2.5% 
today to 1.25% in 2040.  Europe’s Migration Policy Towards the Mediterranean 
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Europe’s total population will grow at a very slow rate – 10 million indi-
viduals, yet 12 million people will stop working.
35 Low fertility rates in the 
EU will clearly bring about a drop in the number of young people entering 
the labour markets leading to an overall contraction of the working-age 
population. Immigration is thus one of the few possible means to compen-
sate for these negative trends.
36  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35  Commission Green Paper, Confronting demographic change: A new solidarity be-
tween the generations, Employment and social affairs, March 2005, pg. 3. Available 
online: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/news/2005/mar/comm2005-94_en. 
pdf.  
36  Fargues (2005), pgs. 2-3.  
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Migrants particularly those coming from the Southern Mediterranean 
shores are on average younger than the ones in continental Europe. At the 
same time, they have more children as they come from countries with 
higher fertility rates. It is within this context that the present demographic 
situation in the Mediterranean can address this issue. Most of the countries 
in the EU’s Southern neighbourhood are still experiencing relatively high 
rates of population growth peaking at work ages. Even if in reality a sharp 
decline in the birth rates has been experienced in recent years, the pressures 
on labour markets will continue to exist for some time. Managing flows of 
immigration from the South (where labour is in surplus) to Europe (where 
shortages are expected), is seen as a potential benefit to both countries of 
destination and of origin. This means that there is a situation of comple-
mentarily between the two sides of the Mediterranean; the South can pro-
vide the North with the active population it lacks.
37  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of course, here one must take notice that migration per se cannot and will 
not curb ageing. However, it can be useful in mitigating the impact of age-
ing on the work force and can be used in tandem with other strategies such 
 
37  Because of low rates of native population growth across the advanced industrial 
world, migration is already a large demographic force. Between 1985 and 1990, in-
ternational migrants accounted for about one-quarter of the developed world’s 
population growth. That figure grew to around 45% during the period 1990 and 
1995: a function of increased immigration and relentlessly low fertility. It likely 
stands at about two-thirds of growth today.  
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as discouraging early retirement and increasing the participation rate of 
women in the labour market.  
Apart from the demographic factor, the EU needs both skilled and un-
skilled labour to help ensure the success of the Lisbon Strategy which aims 
at making the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world. European governments have realised that the market 
for top talent is global and competitive. Led by Canada and Australia, vari-
ous countries have started to redesign migration policies not just to admit, 
but also to attract highly skilled immigrants. These factors have led to 
opening some doors to new immigrants even in European countries such as 
Britian and Germany. The Labour government in Britain issued a dramatic 
increase in work permits since it came to power in 1997 and launched the 
High Skilled Workers Program in 2002 and new legal channels for low-
skilled migrants.
38 In Germany, a so-called ‘green card’ scheme for IT 
workers was designed to address imbalances in the labour market. Before 
these ‘innovations’, both Britain and Germany had virtually closed the door 
to labour migration for more than thirty years.
39 
A counter argument to the notion of a skill based immigration policy by the 
EU is that it deprives the South of a scare resource produced at its expense. 
However if one just looks at the alarming rise of unemployment among 
young people with university degrees in the region, it puts in question the 
perception that high skills remain a scarce resource. At the same time due 
to the obvious economic differentials that exist between the North and the 
South of the Mediterranean, highly skilled migrant workers will send remit-
tances back home (like all other migrants do in various parts around the 
world).
40 Remittances provide an important source of income
41 – even more 
 
38  For example today in Britain, the National Health Service would collapse were it 
not for the large numbers of immigrant doctors, nurses and ancillary staff that keep 
it going.  
39  John Salt (2005), Current Trends in International Migration in Europe, pg. 30. 
40  The Economist, Let the huddled masses in, March 29th 2001.  
41  Remittances today are second only to oil in world trade figures and provide the 
much-needed foreign currencies to the less developed nations. The remittance flow 
has doubled in the few years, reaching $216 billion in 2004, with $150 billion going 
to developing countries. Remittances sent back to the home country by migrants are Marvin Andrew Cuschieri 
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than development assistance or foreign direct investment.
42 Such sources 
can support the development process in the countries of origin if the gov-
ernments provide a conductive environment for economic growth. There-
fore, if a common EU policy is developed for the Mediterranean, it will 
bring about a win-win situation. First, to the destination country, by bring-
ing needed skills without increasing the demographic burden on social sys-
tems, secondly to the country of origin itself, by removing from the labour 
market first job seekers, then getting back enhanced human capital when 
migrants return or when they send their earnings back.  
The same can be said for low skilled immigrants. There are jobs, which na-
tive Europeans are not willing to take, even with the present high unem-
ployment rates. In some member states, the economy (both the official and 
the hidden one) expresses strong demand for unskilled foreign labour. Most 
of the shortages have been around for some time now especially in con-
struction, hotel, farming and restaurant sectors.
43 It would be no real sur-
prise if today, for example, one advertises for a job picking fruit in the 
south of Spain there will be no response from the local citizens. More 
probably, the applicants will be from Morocco. Already we see this reality 
being taken into consideration by some countries such as Italy. The 2002 
Bossi-Fini law has attempted to legalize irregular immigrants, which are 
employed as domestic workers and home-helpers or as dependent workers 
– thus using immigration to fill shortages at the lower end of the job spec-
trum. 
The EU should thus open its borders for both high skilled and low skilled 
migrants. This could be done for example through a points system via a 
 
a major source of foreign exchange earnings for some countries and are an impor-
tant addition to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The remittances that migrants send 
home play also an important part in alleviating poverty in countries of origin. 
42  Global Commission on International Migration (2005), Migration in an intercon-
nected world: New directions for action, pg. 5. Available online: http://www. 
gcim.org/en/finalreport.html. 
43  Commission  Communication,  Integrating Migration issues in the European Un-
ion’s relations with third countries, COM(2002) 703, pg. 11. Available online: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2002/com2002_0703en01.pdf. Europe’s Migration Policy Towards the Mediterranean 
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‘blue card’.
44 The European version of the green card would grant access to 
the entire European labour market. This will regulate the process of immi-
gration in the EU, and migrants have better prospects of integrating. This 
would also lead to less human-catastrophes as migrants emanating from the 
southern shores of the Mediterranean would not risk their lives on untrust-
worthy means of transportation and on human smugglers.  
Developing better strategies for the Mediterranean  
In recent years, there have been some changes in the EU’s official approach 
toward immigration from the Mediterranean. However, the actions have not 
fully followed the rhetoric commitments. The member countries of the EU 
all share to one extent or the other the immigration dilemma however; in 
EU policy-making there has not been enough focus on the difference be-
tween the ‘old’ immigration countries of Northern Europe and the ‘new’ 
immigration countries of Southern Europe.
45 After all most entry points 
within the EU are in the South and East, and thus under Dublin Convention 
more burden is placed on poorer states that do not have the necessary infra-
structure to deal with a large caseload.
46 The EU has tried to remedy this 
situation by establishing the European Refugee Fund (ERF) in 2000.
47 
However, the fund has not really eased the burden of the EU periphery 
states with most of the funds going to the bigger member states. The inco-
herent approach practised under the Dublin Convention has caused some 
major problems to the South European countries, which are the first port of 
call for many immigrants. This necessitates that the EU develops a com-
mon policy with the aim of real burden-sharing among its members and not 
 
44    Jacob von Weizsäcker (2006), Welcome to Europe, pg. 1. Available online: 
http://www.bruegel.org/doc_pdf_358. 
45  Ferruccio  Pastore  (2002),  Just another European Dream? Available online: 
http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/pastore_nov02.html. 
46  Rahimi (2005), pg. 10. 
47  The ERF allocates common European funds to projects that help with the reception, 
integration and repatriation of asylum-seekers, refugees and displaced persons at the 
national, regional and local level. The fund owes it origin to the Tampere Council, 
which called for the establishment of a financial reserve for the implementation of 
emergency measures to provide temporary protection in the event of a mass influx 
of protection-seekers.  Marvin Andrew Cuschieri 
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limited to only some fiscal matters. A revision of the Dublin Convention 
must include provisions which clearly delineate that immigrants can be sent 
to other EU members states and that their applications are processed 
there.
48 This has already been to an extent evoked in the Constitutional 
Treaty (Article III-268).
49  
The EU also needs a policy that involves solving problems at their source 
(ex: CAP reform and opening up of its markets) which will lead to the de-
veloping countries on its borders growing faster economically in the proc-
ess leading to a reduction of people willing to migrate.
50 At the same time, 
the EU should continue to use the MEDA program
51 and help the countries 
of the Mediterranean help themselves. Today more than 50% of the trade in 
the region is with the Union. Europe is the largest direct foreign investor
52 
and the region’s largest provider of financial assistance and funding, with 
nearly 3 billion euros per year in loans and grants.
53 Thus if it wants to re-
duce pressures on its Mediterranean partners the EU must ensure that eco-
nomic reform is pushed through by the governments of the region. At the 
same time efforts such as training programs, voluntary work, better border 
controls and modernization incentives should continue for the entire region 
(ex: EU’s AENEAS program).
54 The EU Southern neighbours should adopt 
 
48  This has already been reiterated by the EP in a resolution on immigration in April 
2006.  
49  Article III-268 of the EU Constitution maintains that: “The policies of the Union set 
out in this Section and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, be-
tween the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to 
this Section shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle.” 
50  Andreas Marchetti (2006), The European Neighbourhood Policy – Foreign policy 
at the EU’s periphery, pg. 29. 
51  MEDA distributes between €800 million and €1 billion a year in financial aid  
52  The Mediterranean countries continue to attract less than 2% of international in-
vestment.  
53  Commission Communication, Tenth Anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean part-
nership: A work program to meet the challenges of the next five years, 
SEC(2005)482 SEC(2005)483, pg. 1. Available online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0139en01.pdf. 
54  AENEAS consists of financial and technical assistance to third countries in the ar-
eas of migration and asylum. For the period 2004-2008 it has been allocated €250 
million.  Europe’s Migration Policy Towards the Mediterranean 
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home-grown reform policies to the realities of the global market, by in-
creasing in particular South-South cooperation.
55  
The present Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), contrary to the agree-
ments for the Eastern European countries in the mid-1990s, gives no strong 
incentives such as membership in the Union, to the North African countries 
in order to collaborate. Although most countries have made substantial 
progress in the adoption of legal provisions aimed at curbing illegal migra-
tion and at strengthening border controls, new incentives are needed. This 
is where the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) could provide new 
impetus. Developed as a post-2004 enlargement strategy, the EU shaped 
the ENP to deal with the EU’s neighbours, with the aim of fostering a 
‘friendly neighbourhood’.
56 This new foreign policy tool for the EU has 
been used in the Mediterranean to provide new momentum for economic 
reform and development by offering participation in the common market. 
In addition, ENP introduces better structures to address the issue of illegal 
migration in the region. Through the ENP, the intensity of dialogue on mi-
gration has increased and with the help of the Action Plans, a comprehen-
sive and balanced approach initiated with the management of legal 
migration and the prevention and fighting of illegal migration, smuggling 
and trafficking of human beings.
57 In the ENP, migration is part of the de-
velopment chapter and goes beyond positive conditionality by introducing 
mutual commitment to migration management. For example, the policy 
approaches migration management on a system based on differentiation 
and progressive implementation of principles.
58 If the ENP also produces 
the desired economic growth in the partner countries, the ‘push’ factors 
will not be that strong anymore. This would help release the Barcelona 
 
55  Stephen Calleya and Eberhard Rhein (2004), The Euro-Med Partnership needs a 
strong push, in Jacobs ed., pg. 25. 
56  Commission Communication, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework 
for relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003)104 final, pg 
4. Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf. 
57  Eneko Landaburu, From Neighbourhood to Integration Policy: are there concrete 
alternatives to enlargement?, pg. 4. Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ 
world/enp/pdf/060223_el_ceps_en.pdf. 
58  Aubarell and Aragall (2005), pg. 11.  Marvin Andrew Cuschieri 
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process from the stalemate in which it had often found itself, allowing 
some countries to progress more rapidly than others. The ENP presently 
still requires fine-tuning and an overall effort by all actors involved. With-
out substantial effort, it could suffer the same fate as the EMP; well-
intentioned principles, but very limited implementation, in the process giv-
ing no real input for the EU efforts to engage itself constructively in the 
Mediterranean region and address migration. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the arguments of more development policies for 
the Mediterranean to try addressing migratory pressures, there is still the 
dilemma that development - will in the long-term reduce migration - yet in 
the short-medium term increase the amount of people willing to migrate. 
This ambiguous situation is known as the ‘migration hump’ and asserts that 
as wealth is created this will enable people to assume the costs and risks of 
migrating. Only at later stages of development, do regions and countries, 
tend to transform from net labour exporters to new labour importers.
59 
Translated to the Mediterranean the argument would go that ‘if you do not 
want Moroccans, take their tomatoes’ this is not valid as Europe may re-
ceive both Moroccans and tomatoes.
60 The fact is that most of the Mediter-
ranean neighbourhood is made of upper lower and middle-income 
countries. This state of affairs creates the ‘perfect’ conditions for one to 
emigrate. It will only be until a certain income threshold is reached that the 
domestic economies would begin to offer people opportunities at home. 
This situation however must not deter the EU to help its neighbours; clearly 
the more economically viable they are – the more stable they are - in the 
process enhancing Europe’s own security concerns.
61  
 
59  Economic development and decreasing income differentials with destination coun-
tries therefore tend to have an inverted U-curve effect on emigration, steeply in-
creasing in the initial phases of economic development and only later gradually 
decreasing.  
60  Wihtol de Wenden (2003), pg. 450.  
61  The EU’s security concerns were outlined in 2000 in its Common Strategy for the 
Mediterranean. The Strategy calls for a more interactive and dynamic relationship 
between the EU and the Mediterranean, greater cooperation in the management of 
borders, alignment of the legal systems of the Mediterranean and EU countries, and 
effective mechanisms to fight against illegal immigration networks. Europe’s Migration Policy Towards the Mediterranean 
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Whilst Europe has offered sweeteners in the form of the ENP to initiate 
economic reform in the Mediterranean countries, it has also beefed up ef-
forts for border control in the Mediterranean. There has been a significant 
deepening of cooperation between the North and South countries on inter-
nal security in areas such as irregular migration and organised crime with 
collaboration being done both within the multilateral framework of EMP, 
as well as on the bilateral level.
62 At the same time recently, the new 
agency FRONTEX is in the process of strengthening operational coopera-
tion in the Mediterranean. The agency is already considered the feasibility 
of Mediterranean coastal patrols networks, and is exploring the technical 
practicability of establishing a surveillance system covering the southern 
maritime border of the EU.
63 This operational cooperation has already 
started with an agreement between Spain and eight other EU members 
agreeing to help patrol Spanish waters along the African coast. This has led 
to Spain’s deputy Prime Minster Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega to 
claim that this is “a common policy on frontier control for the first time on 
the part of the European Union”
64. In October 2006, five EU members also 
joined forces in Operation Nautilus under the auspices of FRONTEX to 
monitor the strait between Sicily and Libya for a two week period. These 
border strengthening measures will continue in the future and constitute a 
way to de-criminalize migration and to recognize the legitimacy of those 
migrants who come to the EU legally. 
A common EU policy in managing economic migration emanating 
from the Mediterranean – towards a more proactive approach 
If the Union wants to ever reduce the number of people crossing the Medi-
terranean illegally it must, apart from developing policies that address bet-
ter its neighbours economic needs and the security environment, also be 
willing to endorse more open and proactive immigration laws. EU migra-
tion policy must focus on managing regular flows if it wants to reach the 
 
62  Lutterbeck (2006), pg. 70.  
63  Times  of  Malta,  The EU plan to combat illegal migration, Available online: 
http://www.timesofmalta.com/core/article.php?id=209836. Marvin Andrew Cuschieri 
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Lisbon targets. At present, the development of both immigration and immi-
grant integration policies is a shared responsibility of national governments 
and European institutions. However, member states attitudes towards more 
supranationality on migration policies are changing. The European Com-
mission has already noticed this change in the air and presented a green 
paper
65 on the topic. In it, many optional systems are outlined, such as a 
common EU selection system to respond to the needs of specific skills that 
includes a point system or an economic test. Within the context of the 
Mediterranean, establishing legal means for migrants to enter EU markets 
is a step in the right direction.  
It is no secret that issues concerning migration are complex in nature. This 
implies a need for broad policy-making and coordination in other relevant 
policy areas such as foreign, security, development and employment poli-
cies. Measures thus need to be applied as a complete package. A proactive 
policy on EU’s borders combining elements of control with facilitation of 
cross-border movements has to become a responsibility of the EU as a 
whole, and not just the countries along its external frontier. If lets say Spain 
becomes too successful at blocking its frontiers, immigrants would simply 
shift their efforts to Italy or other European countries. It is thus more of a 
European problem rather than a Spanish problem – the solution thus has to 
be European as well. 
The current situation with respect to migration flows from the Mediterra-
nean into the EU suggests that a different, more flexible approach common 
to all member states on the issue of legal migration needs to be taken. Such 
a liberal immigration policy should be based on the recognition that migra-
tory pressures will continue and that there are benefits that orderly immi-
gration can bring to the EU, to the migrants themselves and to their 
countries of origin. The EU must reconsider the human dimension of the 
EMP with on the one hand a common migration policy with clarity about 
 
64  EU Observer, EU states to help Spain fight immigration crisis, 30th May 2006. 
Available online: http://euobserver.com/9/21723. 
65  Commission Green Paper, On an EU approach to managing economic migration, 
COM(2004)811 final. Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc 
_centre/immigration/work/doc/com_2004_811_en.pdf. Europe’s Migration Policy Towards the Mediterranean 
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the goal and size of migration and on the other hand better border manage-
ment.
66 
Greater EU involvement would counterbalance the lowest common de-
nominator approach that has characterized the development of migratory 
policies since Maastricht. Of course, such policy should be put in place 
only incrementally in order to facilitate a gradual and smooth move from 
national to Community rules. For example the Commission’s green paper 
declares that the admission of economic migrants should be conceived as a 
‘first step legislation’ and lay down certain common definitions, criteria 
and procedures, while at the same time leaving to the member states to re-
spond to their labour markets needs.
67 Recently JHA commissioner Frattini 
maintained, “It will be up to each member to decide the number of admis-
sions but it will be up to Europe to decide common standards.”
68 The EU 
should also instigate better information campaigns that outline the need of 
migrants and try to change in the process the citizens of Europe attitudes. 
At the same time, it must be expected that migrants from the Mediterranean 
should respect the local way of life, culture and the rule of law.
69 This in 
turn would help them integrate better into society in the process enriching 
Europe’s own culture and contribute towards a better understanding of each 
other civilisations.  
Conclusion 
Ultimately, the EU should introduce common policies that ensure labour 
mobility and cross-border movement in partnership with its Mediterranean 
neighbours. It would be a mistake for Europe to act as a medieval city that 
closes its gates to the outside world. Despite Europe’s rich experience, 
most Europeans still consider migration to be the historical exception. Pub-
 
66  Ludger Kühnhardt (2005), 10 Years Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: The Human 
Dimension Revisited, in Andreas Marchetti ed. Ten years Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership – Defining  European Interests for the next Decade, pg. 88. 
67  Commission Green Paper (2004), pg. 5.  
68  EU Observer, Commission pushed ahead with EU green card scheme, 22nd De-
cember 2005. Article can be accessed online: http://euobserver.com/9/20603. 
69  Kühnhardt (2005), pg. 88. Marvin Andrew Cuschieri 
30   
lic opinion today oscillates between the desire for humanitarian solutions in 
individual cases, and the call for more rigidity towards potential immi-
grants. It is necessary to explain why and how shaping – not preventing – 
future migration to Europe can be managed in the best interests of both mi-
grants and Europeans themselves. In the context of an ageing population 
and a need for certain skills, migrants make an important economic contri-
bution. For the sake of its future, the EU needs to rip these benefits.  
Immigration is not the ‘magic bullet’ that will resolve the problems of la-
bour market shortages and ageing, but immigration is part of the solution 
and can be linked to the economic reform agenda agreed in the Lisbon 
Summit. Better development policies should be devised by the EU bearing 
in mind the needs of the Mediterranean countries whilst member states 
must be ready to delegate more powers to the EU on migration issues. 
Demographic and economic disparities between the North and the South of 
the Mediterranean means that flows of people crossing will persist in the 
future. It is for this reason that EU leaders must acknowledge that migra-
tion flows will continue and the best way to tackle them is to manage them 
in an efficient and practical way.  
The geo-political widening of migration and the European integration has 
led to the need of reconstruction of the policy responses. A proactive policy 
on EU’s borders widely combining element of control with facilitation of 
cross-border movements has to become the responsibility of the EU as a 
whole, and not just the countries along its external frontier. No member 
state can single-handedly meet the challenges of migration; there is a genu-
ine Community added value to be gained by increased coordination be-
tween member states on these issues. The EU must enhance its relations 
with countries bordering the enlarged Union and make migration a real as-
set in foreign policy rather than a liability in Euro-Mediterranean relations. 
For Europe’s own sake, and for the sake of Mediterranean stability and 
prosperity, the EU member states have to lower the bridges, admit more 
people knocking on the doors, develop a consequential integration policy, 
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